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Christian Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus 
Frederick Mark Gedicks* 
This Article rejects arguments by Christian leaders, scholars, 
and others who lament the secularization of the West and urge 
Christian dignity as the foundation of universal human rights. It 
argues instead that only a secular conception of dignity free of 
Christian metaphysics can create an overlapping consensus in 
support of human rights. 
Part I describes the roots of Christian dignity in medieval 
theology and status. Part II briefly recounts how the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment re-centered the end of dignity from knowing 
God to knowing oneself, while the Reformation’s extension of 
original sin to the intellect left Catholicism as the primary 
defender of the medieval dignity tradition in modernity. Part III 
shows that unprecedented religious difference and moral 
pluralism in the West make the Christian dignity promoted by 
religious conservatives implausible as the ground of universal 
human rights. The theological and natural law underpinnings 
and the political implications of Christian dignity alienate and 
exclude unbelievers, non-Christians, and even many Christians, 
impeding the formation of a stable political consensus supporting 
human rights. Part IV concludes with observations about why 
conservative Christians might find the overlapping consensus 
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INTRODUCTION: AN UNFIRM FOUNDATION 
Human dignity is ubiquitous in contemporary rights discourse. 
International rights agreements guarantee dignity,1 as do the 
constitutions of most Western democracies.2 Courts throughout the 
world rely on dignity in deciding human rights cases,3 and 
 
 1. E.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 5 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR];  
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CONVENTION]; 
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty pmbl., opened for signature  
May 3, 2002, C.E.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 7, 2003); see also G.A. Res. 217 A, A Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DECLARATION]. 
 2. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 
19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 656 (2008); e.g., BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
art. 1, at 15 (Christian Tomuschat et al., trans. 2019) (1949), https://www.btg-
bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.). 
 3. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 683–85; e.g., S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
20166/92, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 363, 402 (1995) (declaring human dignity “the very essence” of 
the European Convention). Although the U.S. Constitution does not expressly protect 
human dignity, the U.S. Supreme Court routinely invokes it in constitutional rights 
decisions. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1727 (2018) (sexual-orientation discrimination); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) 
(LGBTQ access to marriage); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (racial discrimination); 
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scholars, jurists, and clerics on both sides of the Atlantic explore its 
meaning for human rights.4 
In concert with conservative Christian leaders who decry the 
marginalization of Christianity in the West,5 a strand of dignity 
scholarship argues the relevance and even preeminence of 
Christian dignity in relation to human rights. Some scholars 
contend that secular conceptions of dignity cannot be understood 
 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (sex discrimination); Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion of Kennedy, O’Connor & Souter, JJ.) (access to 
abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (married use of contraception); 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (bodily integrity). 
 4. See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (Daniel Kayros trans., 2015); ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS:  
COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013); CATHERINE DUPRÉ, 
THE AGE OF DIGNITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE (2015) [hereinafter 
C. DUPRÉ]; RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011); GEORGE KATEB,  
HUMAN DIGNITY (2011); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: 
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF FEAR IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 6068 (2012); MICHAEL E. PERRY,  
A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY 27–35 (2017); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND 
MEANING (2012); ANDREA SANGIOVANNI, HUMANITY WITHOUT DIGNITY: MORAL EQUALITY, 
RESPECT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2017); JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK & RIGHTS  
(Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2015); HUMAN DIGNITY IN CONTEXT: EXPLORATIONS OF A CONTESTED 
CONCEPT (Dieter Grimm et al. eds., 2018) (hereinafter DIGNITY IN CONTEXT]; 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY]; Jove Jim S. Aguas, The Notions of the Human Person and Human 
Dignity in Aquinas and Wojtyla, 3 KRITKE 40 (2009); Nicholas Aroney, The Rise and Fall of 
Human Dignity, 46 BYU L. REV. 1211 (2021); Jasper Doomen, Beyond Dignity, 57 ARCHIV FÜR 
BEGRIFFSGESCHICHTE 57 (2015); Joel Harrison, Christian Accounts of Religious Liberty:  
Two Views of Conscience, 46 BYU L. REV. 1273 (2021); Stamatina Liosi, Why Dignity Is Not the 
Foundation of Human Rights, 8 PUB. REASON 51 (2017); McCrudden, supra note 2;  
Andrea Pin & Luca P. Vanoni, Catholicism, Liberalism, and Populism, 46 BYU L. REV. 1299 
(2021); POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, ON THE 
RIGHT OF THE PERSON AND OF COMMUNITIES TO SOCIAL AND CIVIL FREEDOM IN MATTERS 
RELIGIOUS (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], http://www.vatican.va/ 
archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-
humanae_en.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All 
Russia (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2016/ 
february/documents/papa-francesco_20160212_dichiarazione-comune-kirill.html;  
Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Religious Values and Public Policy, Address to the Brigham Young 
University Management Society, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 29, 1992), 
https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/ensign/1992/10/religious-values-and-
public-policy?lang=eng; Rev. Ravi Zacharias, Interview, Defending Christianity in a Secular 
World, 13 ENRICHMENT 20, 21 (Fall 2008); see also Elder Lance B. Wickman, Religious Freedom 
in a Secular Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical Priorities, and Fairness for All,  
Address at the 2016 Brigham Young University Religious Freedom Conference (July 16, 2016)  
(“[T]he sphere for the free and open exercise of religion is shrinking as society grows more 
indifferent toward religion and as government enforces secular values in areas once 
considered private.”). 
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apart from their roots in the Christian tradition.6 Some go further, 
suggesting that these roots justify sectarian Christian preferences 
by the state.7 Still others insist that only the prism of Christian faith 
yields the correct view of dignity and human rights.8  
This essay is addressed to these and others who lament  
the secularization of Western societies and urge Christian dignity 
as the foundation of universal human rights. Unprecedented 
religious difference and moral pluralism in the West have made 
Christian dignity implausible as the ground for human rights.  
The theological underpinnings and political implications of 
Christian dignity alienate and exclude unbelievers, unaffiliated 
believers, adherents to non-Christian religions, and even many 
Christians, impeding construction of a firm foundation for human 
rights. If Christian dignity is to be the ground of human rights, they 
will rest on a perpetually infirm foundation. Only a political 
conception of dignity free of Christian metaphysics can provide 
that foundation. 
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the roots of 
Christian dignity in medieval theology and status. Part II briefly 
recounts how the Renaissance and Enlightenment re-centered the 
end of dignity from knowing God to knowing oneself, while the 
Reformation’s extension of original sin to the intellect left 
Catholicism as the primary defender of Christian dignity in the face 
of modernity. Part III, the heart of the Article, shows why 
grounding universal human rights in Christian dignity is unlikely 
to underwrite an overlapping consensus about the value and 
necessity of such rights. Part IV concludes with observations about 
 
 6. See, e.g., GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND 
POLITICS WITHOUT GOD 19–20, 57–58 (2005); David P. Gushee, A Christian Theological Account 
of Human Worth, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 275, 288; Brett G. Scharffs,  
Why Religious Freedom? Why the Religiously Committed, the Religiously Indifferent, and Those 
Hostile to Religion Should Care, 2017 BYU L. REV. 957, 962, 964. 
 7. See, e.g., Scharffs, supra note 6, at 964 (defending state-mandated display of crucifix 
in Italian classrooms by reference to Catholic dignity theology); Adrian Vermeule,  
A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017) (arguing for a Catholic “integralism” that 
would infuse politics and law with Catholicism); see also STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND 
CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC 278–79 (tentatively 
endorsing T.S. Eliot’s vision of a Christian society); Michael Stokes Paulson, The Priority of 
God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1203–06 (2013) (arguing that the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. First Amendment protects only duties owed to a transcendent 
Creator-God). 
 8. See, e.g., Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, Scope, and 
Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 181–92 (2013); Janet Soskice, Human Dignity and the 
Image of God, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 229, 240–43. 
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why conservative Christians might find the overlapping consensus 
attractive, and why they might not.  
I. MEDIEVAL DIGNITY 
The idea of dignity was present in antiquity,9 but the idea  
of Christian dignity arose from theology and social rank in the 
Middle Ages. 
A. Imago Dei 
Early Christians adopted the Jewish belief that the dignity of 
humankind lies in its creation in the image of God.10 “And God 
said: ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness . . . .’ And 
God created man in His own image, in the image of God created 
He him; male and female created He them.”11 Christian theology, 
however, demanded reconciliation of creation in the image of 
Judaism’s monotheist God with Trinitarian doctrine, which teaches 
that God is three manifestations of a single divine essence. As James 
Hanvey summarized the problem: 
If Christian revelation is true, and God is a Trinity and the human 
person is made in the image of God, then we must in some way 
be able to discover the imago Trinitatis in the human person.  
If we cannot, then the coherence of revelation and its truth  
become questionable.12 
Augustine argued that the Trinitarian image of the Christian 
God, imprinted on humankind at creation, is the unity of 
“memory,” “understanding,” and “will.”13 These are three 
manifestations of the “intellect” of the soul, or its power to reason.14 
Creation “in the image of God,” therefore, meant the divine 
 
 9. See McCrudden, supra note 2, at 656–58; e.g., CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, at 109 
(Walter Miller trans., 1913) (44 B.C.E.). 
 10. See BARAK, supra note 4, at 18–21; Sergio Dellavalle, From Imago Dei to Mutual 
Recognition: The Evolution of the Concept of Human Dignity in the Light of the Defence of Religious 
Freedom, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 435, 438. 
 11. Genesis 1:26, 27 (Jewish Publication Society of America). 
 12. James Hanvey, Dignity, Person, and Imago Trinitatis, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, 
supra note 4, at 209, 218. 
 13. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE TRINITY bk. VIII, at 258–60 (Stephen McKenna trans.,  
Charles Dollen ed., 1965) (c. 417 C.E.). 
 14. Id., bk. VIX, at 256–57, 263; see also Hanvey, supra note 12, at 218. For Augustine, 
memory, understanding, and will “are the actions of the one mind.” 
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investment in each person of the capacity to act (will) in accordance 
with one’s knowledge (understanding) and experience (memory).  
Centuries later, Thomas Aquinas specified what Augustine 
never quite said: the dignity of humankind is precisely its power to 
act with conscious rationality, as does God. Aquinas argued that 
persons affirmatively act on their reason, rather than being 
passively acted upon by external forces, like animals.15 This power 
to reason is qualitatively the same power possessed by God, albeit 
diminished in human beings: 
Since . . . man is said to be made to God’s image, in so far as the 
image implies an intelligent being endowed with free choice and 
self-movement, . . . it remains for us to treat of His image, that is, 
man, according as he too is the principle of his actions, as having 
free choice and control of his actions.16 
In the Thomist tradition, the dignity of human beings lies in 
their reflection of the image of God as a reasoning being possessed 
of freedom to act on his reason.17 Centuries later, this conception of 
human dignity informed the Second Vatican Council’s statement 
on religious freedom.18 As John Paul II later declared, creation in 
God’s image gave to humankind the “spiritual faculties” of 
“reason, discernment between good and evil, and free will.”19 
B. Noble Dignity 
The Thomistic tradition of dignity developed against a socio-
legal conception of dignity embedded in the feudal hierarchies of 
medieval monarchs and the Church. Those of noble birth or title 
enjoyed special privileges. They were immune from lawsuits by 
 
 15. See I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 162 pt. I, Q. 29, art. i, co.,  
610 pt. I–II, Q. 1, art. i, co. (Dominican Fathers trans., Daniel J. Sullivan rev. trans.) (1485) 
[hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA] in 19 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952). 
 16. I id. at 609 pt. III, pr; see also I id. at 493 pt. I, Q. 93, art. i, sc. (“[I]ntellectual creatures 
alone, properly speaking, are made to God’s image.”). 
 17. See I id. at 165 pt. I, Q. 29, art. ii; I id. Q. 93, art. vi, ad. 1. 
 18. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 4, para. 2 (“It is in accord with their dignity as 
persons—that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and, therefore, privileged to bear 
personal responsibility—that all men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound 
by moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth.”). 
 19. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: EVANGELICUM VITAE, ON THE VALUE AND 
INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE para. 34 (Mar. 25, 1995) [hereinafter EVANGELICUM VITAE], 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae.html. 
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those of lower rank, even for payment of debts lawfully owed, and 
they were often exempt from royal taxation.20 Sumptuary laws 
reserved certain colors and fabrics for royal and noble clothing, and 
only noblemen could wear swords.21 Nobles could not be tried 
before a jury that included men of lower rank; Magna Carta’s 
celebrated guarantee of trial by a jury of one’s “peers” referred 
precisely to the noble privilege of being judged only by those of 
equal or higher rank.22 Powerful customs and conventions 
restricted nobles to a handful of occupations: defending the 
monarchy in warfare, serving in the Church, or managing one’s 
land and estates; other occupations, notably “trade” or commerce, 
were unacceptably common, beneath one’s dignity as a noble.23 
These privileges constituted noble “dignities.”24 
Dignity-as-rank contributed both theoretical and practical 
elements to dignity-as-imago Dei. The capacities to reason and to act 
on reason are bestowed exclusively on human beings. “[U]nlike the 
rest of earthly creation, which follows God’s law by nature, human 
beings are given a share in divine reason, and the faculty of free 
choice . . . .”25 The divine gift of intellect thus raises humankind to 
a rank or “dignity” possessed by no other creature.26 Christianity 
envisioned a “great chain of being,” in Arthur Lovejoy’s  
phrasing,27 originating with God, who guarantees the existence and 
meaning of all creation, and descending through angels and 
humankind down to the lowest of his creatures.28 The hierarchal 
 
 20. See, e.g., John Bell Henneman, Nobility, Privileges, and Fiscal Politics in Late Medieval 
France, 13 FRENCH HIST. STUDS. 1, 1 (1983). 
 21. See, e.g., Josiah C. Russell, The Triumph of Dignity over Order in England,  
9 HISTORIAN 137, 146–47 (1947). 
 22. See Peer, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE def. 4a, https://www-oed-
com.proxlaw.byu.edu/view/Entry/139725?rskey=09QTLQ&result=1#eid (“A member of a 
rank of hereditary nobility in Britain or Ireland; a duke, marquess, earl, viscount, or baron.”). 
 23. See J.M. ROBERTS, PENGUIN HISTORY OF EUROPE 160 (1996). 
 24. WALDRON, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
 25. Christopher Tollefson, The Dignity of Marriage, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY,  
supra note 4, at 486. 
 26. I AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 165 pt. I, Q. 29, art. iii, ad. 2, 406 pt. I, Q. 93, 
art. 6, co., 493 pt. I, Q. 93, art. i, sc., 610 pt. III, Q. 1, art.3, sc. & co.; see also KATEB, supra note 
4, at 3, 6 (“The core idea of human dignity is that on earth, humanity is the greatest type of 
beings. . . . [N]o other species is equal to humanity.”). 
 27. ARTHUR LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN 
IDEA (1936). 
 28. See KATEB, supra note 4, at 25; ROSEN, supra note 4, at 18; see also Genesis 1:26 
(Douay-Rheims) (“Let [man] have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the 
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ranks of royalty, nobility, commoner, and serf mirrored this 
ontotheological hierarchy.29 
As a practical matter, imago Dei did not play a central role in 
Christian theology until nearly the twentieth century.30 Medieval 
Christian leaders enjoyed their high rank; “princes of the Church” 
was not merely metaphor.31 Though God bestowed intellect and 
will upon all his human creations, some were honored for their 
greater portions.32 
II. MODERN DIGNITY 
The Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment transformed 
dignity as both imago Dei and noble rank. The Thomistic tradition 
had embedded dignity within a teleology that prescribed knowing 
God as the end of humankind: he granted us dignity that we might 
use it to love and worship him.33 The Church’s medieval conception 
of religious freedom, as the freedom to live according to the true 
religion, reflected this teleology: the natural law does not bestow 
upon men and women the freedom “to do whatever we choose but 
rather to choose that which is true and good.”34 In modernity, this 
teleology came undone. 
 
air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and over every creeping creature that moveth upon 
the earth.”); Psalm 8:6–8 (Douay-Rheims) (“Thou hast made [man] a little less than the 
angels . . . . Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover, the 
beasts also of the fields. The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea.”). 
 29. Cf. ROBERTS, supra note 23, at 150 (“A chain of [feudal] obligations and personal 
service could stretch (in theory) from the king down through his great men and their 
retainers to the lowest of the free.”). 
 30. E.g., POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: RERUM NOVARUM, ON CAPITAL AND 
LABOR (May 15, 1891) [hereinafter RERUM NOVARUM], http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-
xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.html; see Ingolf U. 
Dalferth, Religion, Morality and Being Human: The Controversial Status of Human Dignity, in 
DIGNITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 69, 70. 
 31. See COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 380 (John A. Garraty & Peter Gay  
eds., 1972); Aroney, supra note 4, at 1218.  
 32. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 18. 
 33. E.g., II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 437 pt. II-II, Q. 10, art. xii, ad. 4, 731  
pt. III, Q. 4, art. ii, ad. 2, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952) (1485); AUGUSTINE, supra note 13, bk. 8, at 262–63; cf. John 17:3  
(Douay-Rheims) (“Now this is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and 
Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.”). 
 34. Hanvey, supra note 12, at 221; see also Harrison, supra note 4, at 1279 (“[C]onscience 
is . . . understood as the site where a person fulfils the duty to respond to the truth  
about God.”). 
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A. Renaissance 
Renaissance philosophers redirected the teleology of imago Dei 
inward, making dignity a tool in service of humanity rather than 
God.35 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, for example, reworked 
dignity from the freedom to pursue God into the freedom of self-
determination: creation in God’s image is oriented, not to 
knowledge of God, but to the fashioning of one’s “own being” by 
one’s “own free will.”36 The intellect was still a gift of God, but its 
end was now to know oneself rather than God.37 Henceforth human 
beings would themselves be responsible for shaping the character 
and content of their lives.38 
B. Reformation 
The Reformation shattered the formal theological unity of Latin 
Christianity. Among its victims was the doctrine of original sin. The 
Church had long taught that original sin had corrupted the will but 
not the intellect; humankind lost the ability perfectly to conform its 
behavior to the demands of natural law and justice, but not the 
ability to know these through the exercise of reason.39 As Aquinas 
concluded, original sin “cannot entirely take away from man the 
fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be 
capable of sin.”40 By contrast, Martin Luther and John Calvin taught 
that original sin had wholly corrupted reason and the intellect, 
making them unreliable guides to justice or truth.41 
 
 35. BARAK, supra note 4, at 25. 
 36. GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF MAN 7 (2005) 
(1496); see also C. DUPRÉ, supra note 4, at 30 (Mirandola reworked “the Imago Dei paradigm 
in the light of man’s new freedom constantly to shape and determine his identity.”). 
 37. As Professors Aroney and Harrison pointed out to me, self-discovery is also a 
theme in Augustine—though still oriented to knowing God. See, e.g., ST. AUGUSTINE,  
THE CONFESSIONS bk. X (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans., 1961) (c. 397–98 C.E.). 
 38. LOUIS DUPRÉ, PASSAGE TO MODERNITY: AN ESSAY IN THE HERMENEUTICS OF 
NATURE AND CULTURE 125 (1993) [hereinafter L. DUPRÉ]. 
 39. See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 48 n.20 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1998); TATHA WILEY, ORIGINAL 
SIN: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS, CONTEMPORARY MEANINGS 141–42 (1989); Dellavalle,  
supra note 10, at 438; Aroney, supra note 4, at 1222. 
 40. II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 179 pt. III, Q. 85, art. 2, co. 
 41. L. DUPRÉ, supra note 38, at 204, 211; WILEY, supra note 39, at 142; Dellavalle,  
supra note 10, at 438–39. 
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The Reformers rested their rejection of reason on Augustine—
Luther was an Augustinian monk—despite Augustine’s 
prominence in identifying dignity with intellect.42 Writing as the 
Roman empire collapsed around him, Augustine “viewed the 
earthly city as a symbol of violence and oppression, blighted by sin 
and incapable of offering its inhabitants the justice and peace of the 
City of God.”43 Many Protestants, therefore, teach that reason’s 
original corruption disqualifies the intellect as a means of 
identifying the natural law, and diminishes its theological place.44 
Protestant dignity lies more in one’s acknowledgment of God’s 
grace in the face of inescapable sin than in reason and intellect.45 
Catholicism thus emerged from the Reformation as the principal 
custodian of the medieval dignity tradition. 
C. Enlightenment 
Mirandola, writing when the Inquisition was still active, 
softened the anti-clerical force of dignity-as-self-determination by 
emphasizing its divine source. Enlightenment humanists felt no 
such need. The decisive figure is Immanuel Kant, who reasoned his 
way to dignity-as-autonomy without relying on God or the Church. 
Kant is known for the “categorical imperative,” the injunction 
that one must always treat people as ends in themselves, and never 
 
Like Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity also rejected the Protestant claim that original 
sin irretrievably tainted reason and intellect. See John Witte, Jr., Introduction to CHRISTIANITY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 8, 23–33 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander 2010) 
[hereinafter CHRISTIANITY & HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 42. See Peter King, Damaged Goods: Human Nature and Original Sin, 24 FAITH & PHIL. 
247, 248–50 (2007). 
 43.  Tina Beattie, The Vanishing Absolute and the Deconsecrated God: A Theological 
Reflection on Revelation, Law, and Human Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, 
at 259, 266; accord L. DUPRÉ, supra note 38, at 33. 
 44. See BARAK, supra note 4, at 23; J. BUDZISZEWSKI, THE REVENGE OF CONSCIENCE: 
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF MAN 80 (1999); ROMMEN, supra note 39, at 54 & n.26;  
Beattie, supra note 43, at 266. 
 45. See, e.g., WILEY, supra note 39, at 142–43 (placing Reinhold Niebuhr’s conception of 
human dignity between the Reformers’ insistence that original sin rendered the intellect 
wholly corrupt and the Thomistic teaching that original sin left it a reliable path to truth); 
Aroney, supra note 4, at 1224–25 (Reformation theologians “tended to place more emphasis 
on the fallenness of human nature and its dependence on divine grace for its restoration.”); 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Modern Protestant Developments in Human Rights, in CHRISTIANITY & 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 41, at 155, 162 (Besides the dignity of creation in the image of 
God, “every human being has his own personal dignity which resides in his predestination 
to personal being.”). 
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solely as means to one’s own ends.46 He considered an equivalent 
formulation to be, “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.”47 A “maxim” is the principle the subject adopts as 
her guide to ethical action.48 When faced with an ethical decision, 
one should act in accordance with a rule that could be coherently 
“universalized” or applied to everyone.49 
The key here is Kant’s view that rational beings are free to 
choose the moral law by and for themselves, so long as they apply the 
same law to others. “Reason . . . refers to every maxim of the will as 
giving universal law to every other will and also to every action 
towards oneself . . . .”50 This capacity for moral self-governance 
constitutes human dignity, “the dignity of a rational being, who 
obeys no law other than that which he at the same time gives.”51 Yet 
the argument is formal rather than substantive: human dignity 
consists in the giving of the moral law to oneself, not in the content 
of the law one gives.52  
Human dignity is thus the source of incomparable human 
worth.53 Whatever “is raised above all price and therefore admits 
of no equivalent,” argues Kant, “has a dignity.”54 The self-direction 
that makes humanity an end in itself “has not merely a relative 
 
 46. IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [hereinafter KANT, 
Groundwork], in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 41, 80 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) [hereinafter 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY]. 
 47. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 73 (emphasis omitted); accord IMMANUEL 
KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 353, 379 
[hereinafter KANT, Metaphysics of Morals]. 
Some Kant scholars dispute that these formulations are equivalent. E.g., Christine M. 
Korsgaard, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution, in RECLAIMING 
THE HISTORY OF ETHICS: ESSAYS FOR JOHN RAWLS 297, 300 (Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman 
& Christine M. Korsgaard eds., 1997). 
 48. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 73 n.*; KANT, Metaphysics of Morals,  
supra note 47, at 379–80. 
 49. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 56 (2008). 
 50. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 84. 
 51. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 52. As always with Kant, what appears to be wildly subjective is objectively ordered 
by his postulate that rational beings possess the same “mental hardware” and thus reason to 
the same or similar conclusions. See Eugene T. Gadol, The Idealistic Foundations of Cultural 
Anthropology: Vico, Kant and Cassirer, 12 J. HIST. PHIL. 207, 219–20 (1974). 
 53. KANT, Groundwork, supra note 46, at 85. 
 54. Id. at 84. 
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worth, that is, a price, but an inner worth, that is, dignity.”55 Dignity 
is priceless because nothing in the human economy matches 
its value. 
Kant departed from the Christian dignity tradition in at least 
three ways. First, the ground of human dignity, the source of 
humanity’s incomparable worth, became self-direction.56 After 
Kant, “to treat people with dignity is to treat them as autonomous 
individuals able to choose their destiny.”57 How one uses her 
autonomy is beside the point of its worth in self-determination. 
With Kant, human dignity arises from the power of each person to 
choose her own path, not from the Christian conformity or moral 
attractiveness of the path she chooses.58  
Second, God and Christianity play no part in Kant’s 
argument.59 Among Kant’s targets were the efforts of Catholicism 
and High-Church Protestantism to maintain clerical control.60 The 
moral law is not given by the Church to Christians, but by 
Christians to themselves. Human dignity is the ability to reason 
and to act; it comes, however, not from creation by God in his 
image, but from the autonomy each person naturally possesses to 
shape her life to her own ends.61 
Finally, Kant decentered dignity-as-rank. The Kantian demand 
that self-given morality be universally applied logically foreclosed 
socio-legal hierarchies. “Where previously dignity was precisely 
what attached to the role a person played in society,” after Kant “it 
would arise from the person who stood apart from the multiplicity 
of roles in which he or she might appear.”62 Because the categorical 
 
 55. Id.; see also id. at 85 (“[T]he lawgiving . . . , which determines all worth, must for 
that very reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth . . . .”). 
 56. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 21–22. 
 57. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 660. 
 58. Cf. Harrison, supra note 4, at 1294 (observing the contemporary emphasis on “the 
centrality of individual judgment—personal autonomy—as the foundation of human dignity 
and the concern of political authority”). 
 59. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 155. 
 60. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question, What Is Enlightenment?, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 46, at 15, 17–21 (arguing that “enlightenment” is the 
capacity and the willingness to make life decisions using one’s own reason and 
understanding, without direction from religious and other external authorities). 
 61. Professor Aroney notes that this orientation left behind the interrelatedness of 
persons and the role of groups intermediate between individual and state, both integral to 
the Catholic conception of dignity. Aroney, supra note 4, at 1234–35.  
 62. David Walsh, Dignity as an Eschatological Concept, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, 
supra note 4, at 245, 249–50. 
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imperative requires application of one’s maxim of action to all in 
the same way it applies to oneself, it cannot logically accommodate 
social ranks and their accompanying “dignities.” In Kant’s world, 
all human beings possess the same dignity in the same measure.63 
III. EQUAL DIGNITY 
Kant and Enlightenment notwithstanding, dignity-as-rank 
persisted in Catholic Christianity into the twentieth century. Leo 
XIII’s 1891 encyclical on the “dignity of labor” laid the foundation 
for a doctrine aimed at lifting up workers and the poor,64 but 
nonetheless reinforced dignity-as-rank by implicitly prioritizing 
capital to labor and men to women.65 While all people possess 
dignity from their creation by God, this dignity consisted “in their 
playing the role that is appropriate to their station within a 
hierarchical social order, one in which some are ‘nobler 
than others.’”66  
Dignity-as-rank began to crumble after World War II. 
Challenged by the economic equality and political justice agenda of 
powerful Marxist movements (especially in Italy), and stung by 
accusations that it did little to stop the Holocaust, the Church 
rethought its role in advancing human dignity. It reconceptualized 
itself as a kind of “human-dignity umbrella,” which shelters the 
exercise of human rights by all people, Catholic or not, believing or 
 
 63. Jeremy Waldron has elaborated equal rank and status into a general theory of 
dignity and human rights. See WALDRON, supra note 4. Of course, even liberal democracies 
have perpetuated a sort of hierarchical rank with salutations, titles, and deference for 
government officials, doctors, lawyers, academics, and others whose education or 
accomplishments are thought to represent special “merit.” 
 64. See McCrudden, supra note 2, at 662. 
 65. See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 30, paras. 4–5, 46–47 (condemning economic 
redistribution); id. paras. 17, 19, 34 (suggesting that economic inequality is dictated by the 
natural law); id. paras. 36, 42 (implying that women in the workplace cause immorality, 
declaring women unsuited for certain occupations, and concluding that women be confined 
to the domestic sphere to which they are naturally suited); see also ROSEN, supra note 4, at 48–
51 (arguing the profoundly hierarchical character of Leo’s economic and social thinking); 
SANGIOVANNI, supra note 4, at 29–30 (noting the nineteenth-century Church’s “ambivalent 
relationship with democracy,” “religious freedom,” and “natural liberal rights”). 
 66. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 49. 
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not;67 John Paul II particularly embraced this role.68 Though 
Christian dignity remains largely informed by a distinctively 
Catholic theology, that theology now concludes that dignity is 
equally the entitlement of all members of the political community.69 
Nevertheless, even this expanded conception of Christian dignity 
is insufficient to ground universal human rights. 
A. An Overlapping Consensus 
One of John Rawls’s insights was that a stable political order 
safeguarding basic human rights cannot persist in conditions of 
pluralism unless its participants abandon the quest to enact their 
differing metaphysical commitments into law.70 Only by bracketing 
these commitments can an “overlapping consensus” emerge that 
attracts broad support precisely because it safeguards basic rights 
that allow individual pursuit of the good and the true.71 The 
emphasis on political rather than metaphysical consensus explains 
“how, given the plurality of conflicting comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines always found in a democratic 
society . . . [,] free institutions may gain the allegiance needed to 
endure over time.”72 
Rawls’s theory is controversial,73 though even his critics 
concede he is the starting point for contemporary political 
 
 67. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture:  
An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 71, 
124–27 (2014). 
 68. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 88 (1984); Zachary R. Calo, Catholicism, Liberalism and Human Rights,  
1 J. CHRISTIAN LEGAL THOUGHT 9 (2011); Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1304. 
 69. See Aroney, supra note 4, at 1234–35; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 70. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133–34 (2005) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
LIBERALISM]. Rawls specified these “basic rights” as political and civil equality, equal 
opportunity, economic reciprocity, and mutual respect. See id. at 139. 
 71. Id. at 138–42; see also id. at xlv (“[R]ather than confronting religious and nonliberal 
doctrines with a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine, the thought is to formulate a 
liberal political conception that those nonliberal doctrines might be able to endorse.”).  
For Rawls’s detailed exposition of the overlapping consensus, see id. at 133–72, 385–95. 
 72. John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
233, 234 (1989). 
 73. See, e.g., Michael G. Barnhart, An Overlapping Consensus: A Critique of  
Two Approaches, 66 REV. POL. 257 (2004); Maurits De Jongh, Le libéralisme politique se  
réfute-t-il lui-même? [Is Political Liberalism Self-Defeating?], 68 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE 
POLITIQUE 515 (2018). 
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philosophy.74 But one need not accept Rawls’s normative claims to 
recognize the descriptive insight illuminated by his argument for a 
metaphysically thin consensus. In radically plural societies 
committed to the protection of human rights, a thick metaphysical 
account of the truth is unlikely to attract broad, enduring support 
for democracy and human rights without state repression that 
would undermine both. 
B. Problems for Christian Dignity 
The question whether Christian dignity ought to ground 
human rights in the overlapping consensus raises the further 
question, which Christianity? One might construct a universal or 
widely shared Christianity for analytic purposes, but this would 
indeed be a fabrication—Christian denominations and sects are 
innumerable and sharply diverse in their beliefs and practices. 
Only a Christianity raised to a very high level of abstraction  
could authentically incorporate all or most of contemporary 
Christian belief. 
A highly abstract Christianity is unlikely to capture the real 
problems of building the overlapping consensus on Christian 
dignity. Abstract Christianity is not the root of political conflicts in 
the West. Politically liberal Christians, like the Protestant 
“mainline” in the U.S. and the remnants of state churches in 
Europe, have, for the most part, already adapted their beliefs to an 
overlapping political consensus.75 It is conservative Christianity—
Catholicism and evangelical Protestantism—that currently insists 
on a Christian ground of human rights in tension with 
overlapping values.76 
Rather than attempt to fashion a generalized Christianity, 
therefore, I will use contemporary expressions of conservative 
Christianity to analyze its relation to the overlapping consensus. 
The metaphysics of conservative Christian dignity renders it an 
inapt foundation for contemporary human rights, for at least three 
reasons: the stringency of the Catholic teleology that primarily 
 
 74. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974) (“Political 
philosophers now must either work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not.”). 
 75. See, e.g., OLIVIER ROY, IS EUROPE CHRISTIAN? 62 (Cynthia Schoch trans., 2019)  
(“The dominant trend in European Protestantism is the self-secularization of the religious 
sphere, both in terms of morals—the best of Christianity resides in ethics, which are 
universal—and in terms of theology—God reveals himself in the profane.”). 
 76. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
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informs its contemporary content, its tension with Western 
commitments to political and social equality, and its prioritization 
of the good to the right.  
1. Catholic teleology 
John Paul II sometimes spoke of Christian dignity in Kantian 
terms,77 yet his conception of dignity could not have been more 
different. Christian dignity and its succeeding Enlightenment 
conceptions both incorporate the individual power to make of 
oneself what one will, but for quite different ends. Christian dignity 
is oriented to an external good (knowledge and love of God), 
whereas Kantian dignity is oriented to an internal one (realization 
of the self as its own end).78 Kant understood personal freedom to 
be constrained by the reality that it “coexist with the freedom of 
every other,”79 whereas the Pope affirmed transcendent constraints 
beyond the competing claims of mere mortals.80 
It would seem self-evident that a political consensus founded 
on Christian dignity is unlikely to attract non-Christian and 
unbelieving members in a pluralistic polity. Christian dignity 
presupposes the God who fulfilled the promises of the Old 
Testament with the Gospel of the New; it offers something 
theologically unpalatable to almost every other species of belief—
the mystery of the Trinity, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection to 
nonsalvific or more rigorous monotheists (Jews and Muslims); a 
commitment to monotheism that contradicts polytheism (Hindus) 
and animistic spirituality (First Nations, Native Americans, and 
other indigenous religions); and an insistence on transcendence to 
immanence (Buddhists and other Asian religions).81 On top of all 
 
 77. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 99–100 (quoting EVANGELICUM VITAE, supra note 19, para. 
19; POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: VERITATIS SPLENDOR para. 48 (1993), 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html). 
 78. See John F.X. Knasas, Kantianism and Thomistic Personalism on the Human Person: 
Self-Legislator or Self-Determiner?, 7 STUDIA GILSONIANA 437, 444–49 (2018). 
 79. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 47, at 393. 
 80. See ROSEN, supra note 4, at 100. 
 81. Dellavalle, supra note 10, at 439; see also SANGIOVANNI, supra note 4, at 63  
(noting the “sectarian character” of imago Dei); SMITH, supra note 7 (arguing for a conflict 
from antiquity between pagan immanence and Christian transcendence). 
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these are the “nones,” or the “spiritual but not religious,”82 who 
might encounter even greater dissonance. 
One might object that theological difference does not preclude 
political consensus. As James Davison Hunter observed, 
contemporary “orthodox” or “traditional” believers may have 
more in common with conservatives of other religions than they do 
with their “liberal” or “progressive” brothers and sisters of the 
same faith.83 This suggests that Christian dignity might similarly 
cross religious lines to form an overlapping consensus attractive to 
non-Christians and unbelievers. 
Ironically, Hunter’s observation illustrates both the need for an 
overlapping consensus and how ill-suited Christian dignity is to 
ground it. Cultural conservatives are only able to make common 
political cause with each other by bracketing deep theological 
differences, just as Rawls advises the bracketing of all 
comprehensive beliefs.84 But cultural conservatism still leaves out 
cultural liberalism; even as culture rather than religion, 
conservative Christianity embodies beliefs and commitments that 
are not uniformly or widely shared in Western democracies.85  
Ronald Dworkin encapsulated the challenge: “[M]any people in 
Europe and America insist on connecting human rights with some 
religious tradition. If we insist that human rights have finally a 
religious source and ground, then our appeal to those rights will 
inflame people whose religious traditions and convictions are very 
different from our own . . . .”86 (If “inflame” seems overwrought, 
“antagonize” or “provoke” does not.) This remains true when the 
 
 82. The literature on these “not quite believers” is large and growing. See, e.g., DIANA 
BUTLER BASS, CHRISTIANITY AFTER RELIGION: THE END OF CHURCH AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW 
SPIRITUAL AWAKENING (2012); Rebecca French, Shopping for Religion: The Change in Everyday 
Religious Practice and Its Importance to the Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127 (2003); PEW FORUM  
ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, “NONES” ON THE RISE (Oct. 9, 2012), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-
full.pdf; Stephen J. Stein, Religion/Religions in the United States: Changing Perspectives and 
Prospects, 75 IND. L.J. 37 (2000). 
 83. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 47 (1991). 
 84. Hunter and others have noted the political alliances of Latter-day Saints, 
evangelical Protestants, and other religious conservatives despite longstanding theological 
animosity. See id. at 100, 145, 181; DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CONSERVATIVE CHURCHES ARE 
GROWING 138–42 (1972). 
 85. See generally LORI G. BEAMAN, THE TRANSITION OF RELIGION TO CULTURE IN LAW 
AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE (2020) (detailing the political rifts and social schisms created when 
Christianity is treated as culture rather than religion). 
 86. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 339. 
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ground of dignity is shifted from Christian theology to Christian 
culture. Neither a dignity defined by Trinitarian teleology nor one 
enlisted with religious conservatives in the Culture Wars is likely 
to persuade most liberal Christians, non-Christians, or unbelievers 
of its preeminent claim to ground universal human rights.87  
2. Uncertain equalities 
 A signal achievement of Western democracy is equality of 
rights—the idea that fundamental rights, privileges, and 
immunities are held by all, regardless of social rank or status. The 
major human rights texts guarantee equal rights, either directly,88 
or by general prohibitions of discrimination based on race, 
ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, religion, and other comparable 
characteristics.89 The national constitutions of most Western 
democracies contain similar provisions.90 
Many Western democracies also guarantee equal dignity  
in tandem with equal rights.91 This is the legacy of Kant.  
Beyond respect for one’s own life, argued Dworkin, the categorical 
imperative “entails a parallel responsibility for the lives of all 
human beings. If you are to respect yourself, you must treat their 
lives, too, as having an objective importance.”92 But Kantian dignity 
 
 87. Dellavalle, supra note 10, at 440. 
 88. E.g., U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1, ¶ 2; UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1,  
pmbl., art. 1. 
 89. E.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1, art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2, ¶ 1, 
art. 26; EUROPEAN CONVENTION, supra note 1, art. 9, protocol 12, art. 1. 
 90. E.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, ¶¶ 15(1), 28 (U.K.); 1958 CONST. pmbl., 
art. 1, (Fr.); BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY art. 3, at 15 (Christian 
Tomuschat et al. trans., 2019) (1949), https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf; 
Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868) (Equal Protection 
Clause). In the United States, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit religious 
discrimination. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,  
508 U.S. 520 (1993); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
 91. E.g., Art. 3 COSTITUZIONE [COST.] (It.) (“All citizens have equal social dignity . . . . 
It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an economic or social nature which 
constrain the freedom and equality of citizens . . . .”) (translated in CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ITALIAN REPUBLIC, Art. 3, https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/ 
costituzione_inglese.pdf); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660, 672–73, 681 (2015) 
(holding that the “equal dignity” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
marriage equality); see UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 1, art. 1 (“All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights.”). 
 92. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 255. 
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is more than the right to respect; it is the right to the same respect.93 
With Kant, “dignity and equality go together.”94 Equal dignity, in 
its turn, implies a particular understanding of equal rights. Both 
Christian and Kantian dignity incorporate self-determination as a 
matter of morality and ethics (though, again, each differs in its end 
or purpose). If dignity is the power to decide for oneself what the 
good is and to conform oneself to it, as Kant maintained, then  
the right to equal dignity guarantees this to everyone in the 
same measure.  
Different people will decide upon different and often 
incommensurable ideas of the good, so conflicts are inevitable.  
A government that is both ordered and democratic requires a 
means of mediating these conflicts. Unlike moral and ethical 
decisions, however, resolution of legal conflicts over the good 
cannot be left to personal choice, but must be enforced by state 
coercion under law, through the definition of rights.95 Rights are 
not suggestions; they embody the respect the state may demand that 
its citizens afford each other, the actions it may properly coerce 
citizens to take (or to refrain from taking) in their interactions 
with others.96 
This prevents Christian dignity from adequately grounding 
human rights, even now that its principal guardian teaches 
universal entitlement to those rights. Neither dignity nor rights can 
depend on moral concessions by others. History teaches that 
Christians, like most of humankind, do not consistently endorse or 
respect human rights; today, some conservative Christians hesitate 
or refuse to recognize rights widely recognized in liberal 
democracies, while some Catholic scholars even question the 
Church’s commitment to liberalism itself.97 People are owed 
 
 93. Isabel Trujillo, Dignity, Rights, and Virtues in the Department of Value, in DIGNITY IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RONALD DWORKIN 246, 260 (Salman Khurshid, 
Lokendra Malik & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco eds., 2018); accord Dalferth, supra note 30, at 
91, 124; see also DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 266 (“[T]reating people with the respect we accord 
ourselves requires, at a minimum, that we claim no right in ourselves that we do not grant 
others and suppose no duty for them we do not accept for ourselves.”). 
 94. ROSEN, supra note 4, at 31; see also KATEB, supra note 4, at 1 (“[Dignity] now turns 
out to mean in its most common use the equal dignity of every person . . . .”). 
 95. George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533, 
535–43 (1987). 
 96. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 4, at 50; Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in 
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); Fletcher, supra note 95, at 544. 
 97. See Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1299–302. 
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dignity and rights irrespective of Christian teachings or their 
observance by Christians—indeed, often in the face of those 
teachings. Rights grounded in Christian dignity would perpetually 
depend on the understanding and evolution of these rights within 
Christianity. Human dignity does not consist in what Christianity 
teaches is morally owed to others, but the treatment those others 
may legally demand—of Christians, non-Christians, and the state 
itself—irrespective of what Christians think. 
In a society that values equal rights, every right must be  
the expression of a reciprocal freedom: the state is only justified  
in coercing respect for rights if each right we demand for ourselves 
is also afforded to everyone else. As Kant put it, “Any action is  
right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with  
a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each  
can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a  
universal law.”98 When a person legally claims more freedom for 
herself than she grants to others, she is a hindrance to freedom,  
and the state is justified in coercively reigning in her claim, since  
the state’s “hindering of a hindrance to freedom” actually 
preserves freedom.99  
In Western democracies, conservative Christians are often 
unwilling to accept the reciprocity of rights that equal dignity 
implies. Resistance to antidiscrimination laws is an obvious 
example. These laws safeguard the equal dignity of women and of 
racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, by ensuring that they 
do not suffer harm or disadvantage from stereotypes, prejudice, or 
exclusion. Conservative Christians in the United States often seek a 
 
 98. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 47, at 387. 
 99. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted). Rawls makes a comparable argument. See JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 31, at 195–201 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE]. 
It is often assumed that Kant’s discussion of dignity in Groundwork applies tout court 
to his argument for the universal principle of right in Metaphysics of Morals. The latter, 
however, does not mention “dignity,” let alone discuss it, and for good reason: the right is 
not a matter of morality, but of justified state coercion. BARAK, supra note 4, at 117;  
ROSEN, supra note 4, at 90; Fletcher, supra note 95, at 543, 553. 
The extent to which Kant’s moral philosophy informs his political philosophy remains 
a matter of controversy among Kant scholars. Compare CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING 
THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 83–84, 103 n.7 (1996) (arguing for a connection), and  
Japa Pallikkathayil, Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121 
ETHICS 116 (2010) (same), with Herlinde Pauer-Studer, “A Community of Rational Beings”. 
Kant’s Realm of Ends and the Distinction between Internal and External Freedom,  
107 KANT-STUDIEN 125 (2016) (arguing against a connection), and Christian F. Rostbøll, Kant, 
Freedom as Independence, and Democracy, 78 J. POLS. 792 (2016) (same). 
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right to be categorically excused from observing norms prohibiting 
LGBTQ and (sometimes) sex discrimination, yet seek the protection 
of such laws for themselves.100 Conservative Christian nonprofit 
and commercial businesses have taken comparable positions in 
disputes involving mandatory coverage of contraception and 
related reproductive services in employee health plans, seeking 
categorical exemptions that vindicate employer free-exercise rights 
without concern for the loss of contraception coverage by 
employees with different beliefs about contraception.101 
In tension with the Western commitment to equality, 
conservative Christians claim asymmetric rights of exemption from 
laws protecting or enhancing the exercise of reproductive rights 
and LGBT antidiscrimination rights, while insisting for themselves 
the antidiscrimination protections and social welfare benefits they 
deny to others. This makes Christian dignity an implausible basis 
for forming an overlapping consensus for the protection of 
human rights. 
3. Exclusive truth 
The refusal of conservative Christians to accept some 
applications of equal rights and equal dignity is not simply the 
consequence of group self-interest. Conservative Christian 
religions—especially Catholicism—adhere to one conception of the 
good; they claim that the truth about God and his creation is 
accessible to all through the exercise of natural reason.102 Laws, 
institutions, and other government actions that do not conform to 
 
 100. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(2018) (baker arguing that his conservative Protestant beliefs against same-sex marriage 
require his exemption from civil rights law requiring him to bake wedding cake for  
same-sex marriage), with Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. 
granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123) (Catholic Social Services arguing that city 
anti-discrimination policy barring it from city-sponsored adoption program because of 
opposition to same-sex marriage constitutes unlawful religious discrimination). 
 101. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,  
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Paying for the Boss’s Beliefs, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2014, at A15 cols.3-4 (“Americans must be free to practice their 
respective faiths but also free from bearing the burdens of their employer’s faith.”). 
 102. See DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 4, para. 3 (“Man has been made by God to 
participate in th[e divine] law, with the result that, under the gentle disposition of divine 
Providence, he can come to perceive ever more fully the truth that is unchanging.”);  
e.g., Tollefsen, supra note 25, at 493 (asserting that, because the Catholic conception of 
marriage is based on the natural law, it is persuasive even to unbelievers). 
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the natural law are unjust or deficient;103 all persons, therefore, are 
obligated to oppose them or, at least, to withhold their support.104 
As Rawls observed, political theories which presuppose “but one 
conception of the good which is to be recognized by all persons . . . 
tend to be teleological and to hold that institutions are just to the 
extent that they effectively promote this good.”105 
For example, natural-law theorists argue for a single, true 
conception of marriage, necessarily exclusive of other conceptions: 
marriage is an intrinsic human good, realized by reproductive 
sexual acts within a heterosexual relationship between two persons 
committed to each other as friends, partners, and parents.106 While 
this definition does not expressly rely on God or transcendent 
knowledge, the Biblical injunction that husband and wife become 
“one flesh” is an indispensable premise;107 not a mere metaphor for 
marital accord,108 this commandment signifies a literal physical 
 
 103. See II AQUINAS, SUMMA, supra note 15, at 228 Q. 95, art. 2, co. (“[E]very human law 
has just so much of the character of law as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any 
point it differs from the law of nature, it is no longer law but a corruption of law.”);  
SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. I, Q. 5, at 11 (Anna S. Benjamin trans., 
1964) (c. 395 C.E.) (“I think that a law that is not just is not a law.”); MARK C. MURPHY, 
NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 10–11 (2006) (arguing that an unjust law is 
still a law but a defective one, in the same way that a duck that is a poor swimmer is defective 
but still a duck). 
 104. See GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 145 (1974); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual 
Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11, 31 (1995). 
 105. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 223, 
248 (1985); see also RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 396 (contrasting teleological theories of 
the good with metaphysically “thin” theories). 
 106. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 168 (1999); Finnis, supra 
note 104, at 28. 
 107. Compare Genesis 2:24 (Douay-Rheims) (“Wherefore a man shall leave father and 
mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they shall be two in one flesh.”), with Finnis, supra 
note 104, at 30–31 (“A husband and wife who unite their reproductive organs in an act of 
sexual intercourse which . . . is of a kind suitable for generation, do function as a biological 
(and thus personal) unit and thus can be actualizing and experiencing the two-in-one-flesh 
common good and reality of marriage . . . .”), GEORGE, supra note 106, at 139 (describing 
marriage as a “two-in-one-flesh communion of persons” that is “an intrinsic . . . human 
good”), Tollefson, supra note 25, at 490 (asserting that in one view the marital is realized 
when spouses join “so as to become ‘one flesh’”), and John Tuskey, The Elephant in the Room—
Contraception and the Renaissance of Traditional Marriage, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 315, 320 (2006) 
(claiming that contraception is inconsistent with a “one flesh” union). 
 108. Tuskey, supra note 107, at 320. 
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unity achievable only in heterosexual intercourse.109 Conservative 
Protestants accept this conclusion without its metaphysics.110 
Unbelievers, non-Christians, and many Christians reject this 
narrow and complex definition of marriage. Many religions have 
no objection to same-sex marriage, and some affirmatively support 
it111—even conservative Christians may find the analytic weight 
borne by a single Biblical allusion to be more than it, and they, can 
bear. Yet acceptance of same-sex marriage would require 
conservative Christians to abandon part of the good around which 
their religious faith is organized—namely, traditional marriage.  
It’s less that they refuse to recognize marriage equality, which 
would constitute mere bigotry, and more that they can’t—their 
theologies do not permit it. 
This conservative Christian conception of marriage runs 
through many constitutional issues touching marriage, sexuality, 
and reproduction in Western democracies. It is a source of Catholic 
opposition not only to the legalization of controversial practices 
like human cloning, euthanasia, and genetic manipulation, but also 
opposition to abortion (in all circumstances), contraception, 
premarital sex, in vitro fertilization, and, of course, same-sex 
marriage.112 Conservative Protestants share the opposition to 
abortion (in most circumstances), certain forms of contraception, 
premarital sex, and same-sex marriage. Yet many Westerners—
perhaps most—engage in or approve of these behaviors and 
practices, which generally enjoy constitutional protection.113  
 
 109.  Id. at 168–69 (“In sexual intercourse between a man and a woman . . . the bodily 
parts of the male and the bodily parts of the female participate in a single action, coitus . . . a 
unitary action in which the male and the female become literally one organism.”); accord 
Finnis, supra note 104, at 28; Tollefson, supra note 25, at 490. 
 110. See Gilbert Meilaender & Philip Turner, in Contraception: A Symposium, 88 FIRST 
THINGS 17, 23–24 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Contraception Symposium]; R. Albert Mohler, Jr.,  
in id. at 25. 
 111. FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 16 (2016). 
 112. See, e.g., Archbishop Charles J. Chaput, in Contraception Symposium, supra note 110, 
at 20; see also ROY, supra note 75, at 99 (John Paul II and Benedict XVI identified  
“abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage[, and] artificial procreation” as “non-negotiable 
moral issues.”). 
 113. Natural law theorists are clear that the state is obligated to ban abortion, artificial 
reproductive technologies, and same-sex marriage; the logic of their position also extends to 
prohibition of contraception for married couples. See Ryan T. Anderson, Proxy Wars over 
Religious Liberty, NAT’L AFFS., Spring 2020, at 152, 153 (lamenting that “[f]ew people have 
argued that contraception is immoral, and that therefore a government mandate requiring 
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Rawls labels this prioritization of the good to the right an 
obstacle to formation of the overlapping consensus, which is 
political, not metaphysical. The overlapping consensus is 
constituted by a set of largely instrumental rights oriented to self-
realization, not a single conception of the good.114 Indeed, a 
consensus founded on a single conception of the good is neither 
“overlapping” (a point of convergence for incommensurable 
comprehensive doctrines) nor “political” (resting on a 
metaphysically thin set of rights instrumental to individual 
autonomy). The overlapping consensus requires, therefore, the 
priority of the right to the good, not vice versa. 
An overlapping consensus cannot form around the 
conservative conception of the good to which Christian dignity is 
now oriented. Whenever this good is inconsistent with the exercise 
of a basic human right, including equality of rights, Christian 
dignity would require that the right give way to the good, as 
conservative Christians understood that marriage equality should 
have been subordinated to traditional marriage. 
IV. CHRISTIAN DIGNITY AND THE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
Christian and liberal values enjoyed a tentative alliance during 
the post-war years, when Europe and the United States 
recommitted themselves to human rights while retaining 
traditional Christian values in law.115 Towards the end of the 
twentieth century, this alliance came apart under the centrifugal 
pressures of increasing secularity and religious and moral 
pluralism,116 exposing the current ideological fault: Protestant state 
 
coverage of it is unjust—for everyone, not just religious or conscientious objectors”);  
Tuskey, supra note 107, at 315 (“[C]ontraception is antithetical to the traditional  
Christian understanding of marriage” and “vitiates the logic” that distinguishes Christian 
marriage from same-sex marriage and other relationships.). Some theorists are more 
circumspect, suggesting that a prudential respect for marital privacy could justify confining 
contraception bans to unmarried persons. See GEORGE, supra note 106, at 152–53;  
Finnis, supra note 104, at 1076. 
 114. Even a political conception of justice must include a few substantive commitments 
constituting a “thin theory of the good.” See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 396–97; RAWLS, 
LIBERALISM, supra note 70, at 178. 
 115. See Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1303–04; e.g., WIL HERBERG, PROTESTANT—
CATHOLIC—JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955).  
See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 423–72 (2007). 
 116. See, e.g., ROY, supra note 75, at 71 (suggesting Paul VI reaffirmed traditional 
teachings in Humanae Vitae because “[s]ociety’s values were no longer secularized Christian 
values”). See generally SMITH, supra note 7, at 258–300; TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 473–504. 
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churches (in Europe) and the liberal Protestant “mainline” (in the 
United States) “self-secularized” to fit within the more political 
consensus that was emerging, while the Catholic Church and 
evangelical Protestant faiths soldiered on alone in a quest to 
preserve or restore substantive Christian values as the implicit 
ground of law and public life.117  
Of course, laws in the West no longer implicitly reflect Christian 
values. Christian assertions of religious free exercise have 
accordingly become more controversial as the sites of 
accommodation have become more public.118 In the overlapping 
consensus, government and public spaces are either secular or 
religiously neutral. Christianity and belief generally are in long 
term decline while disaffiliation and unbelief are on the rise. Indicia 
of Christian practice are low, even in the United States. European 
nationalists now appropriate symbols of Christian faith as markers 
of secular political identity without regard for their once-potent 
Christian meaning;119 U.S. Establishment Clause doctrine likewise 
permits government display of Christian symbols only on the 
assumption their meaning is not religious.120 
Conservative Christians might be attracted to a metaphysically 
thin overlapping consensus as a response to their increasing 
minority status. Western democracies guarantee freedom of 
worship, freedom from religious persecution and violence, political 
 
 117. ROY, supra note 75, at 86; see also Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1326 (suggesting 
that Catholicism continues to endorse human dignity and constitutional culture, but has 
departed from liberalism “because it does not perceive it as compatible with key ideals such 
as localism or transcendence, or solidarity with the poor”); John Milbank, Dignity Rather Than 
Rights, in UNDERSTANDING DIGNITY, supra note 4, at 205 (“Catholicism,  
and its development of ‘dignity’, remains at bottom incompatible with liberal notions of 
rights and democracy.”). 
 118. I have discussed the importance of the public/private distinction to the problem 
of religious accommodations in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dignity and Discrimination,  
46 BYU L. REV. 961 (2021), and Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Odd Couple: Freedom from Religion 
and Religious Group Rights, YOUTUBE (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=qBA5kJym7Qo&list=PLhqg559k1eTvNNNaJLVUL9-LNTt_SfLQ-&index=41&t=0s. 
See also Wickman, supra note 5 (discussing religious accommodations in terms of the 
public/private distinction). 
 119. ROY, supra note 75, at 120–24; Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1319–20. 
 120. E.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (state display of 
large Latin cross held constitutional because it predominantly signified military sacrifice); 
Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. C.L. Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (same regarding Christmas tree and 
Hanukkah menorah because context transformed them into secular symbols of the “winter 
holiday season”). 
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equality among believers and between believers and unbelievers,121 
including the right of religions to govern themselves and their 
members in private or “internal” spaces, the freedoms to 
proselytize willing listeners and to change or abandon religious 
belief or affiliation, and the freedom to exercise religion beyond 
private spaces so long as the rights of others are not infringed.122 
This leaves conservative believers and the groups with which they 
affiliate generally free to chart their own courses.123 
This political overlapping consensus is attractive to many 
religious minorities. Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman 
observe that Jews have “benefited tremendously from the rise of a 
secular state, one in which religious status does not determine 
rights of citizenship or, more generally, a person’s life chances.”124 
Other religious minorities can say the same, including conservative 
Christians. The overlapping consensus would appear even more 
attractive if regulation of private religious spaces were relaxed and 
private religious speech and exercise not so rigorously excluded 
when allowing them would not significantly threaten the rights 
of others.125  
But the attractiveness of the overlapping consensus to a 
religious minority depends first on recognition that it is, in fact, a 
minority. Many conservative Christians are not yet reconciled to 
 
 121. Marco Ventura, The Formula “Freedom or Religion or Belief” in the Laboratory of 
the European Union (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Modest institutional religious preferences remain in those European countries,  
like the United Kingdom, Germany, and Scandinavia, that have retained weak 
religious establishments. 
 122. Cf. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 679 (proposing a “minimum core” or “overlapping 
consensus” for dignity consisting of commitment to the “intrinsic worth” of every human 
being, the mandatory recognition of this worth by others, and the priority of the individual 
to the state). 
 123. Pin & Vanoni, supra note 4, at 1303; see also WEIGEL, supra note 6,  
at 61, 182 (lamenting the substantively thin character of the overlapping consensus). 
 124. Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
497, 515 (2019). 
 125. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE 
UNNECESSARY CONFLICT 2 (2020) (“Most Americans . . . would like to live in peace with their 
fellow citizens, and are willing to consider and, if possible, accommodate other people’s 
perspectives and fears.”); RAVITCH, supra note 111110, at 19 (Secular and religious moderates 
are “caught between religious conservatives who want to roll back advances for LGBT and 
reproductive freedom and secular progressives who view all religious freedom laws 
as dangerous.”). 
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the fact that they can no longer dictate the good to all of society.126 
These will not find the overlapping consensus attractive unless and 
until they come to terms with the reality that they have been 
overtaken as political and cultural arbiters of the West. 
In any event, conservative Christianity is an obstacle to 
formation of an overlapping political consensus in support of 
human rights, and thus ill-suited to provide their foundation, now 
and in the future.  
  
 
 126. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson & Robert P. George, The Unfairness of the Misnamed 
“Fairness for All” Act, J. LEG. ONLINE SUPP., Summer 2020, at 1, 
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg_blog/4/ (arguing that law should incorporate 
traditional teachings about gender, sex, and marriage and should fully accommodate 
believers in these teachings when the law deviates from them); id. at 7–8. 
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